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1. 
I have lost count of the number of conferences I have attended on Robots, 
Artificial Intelligence (AI), and the Future of Work. Predicting the future has once 
again become big business, a sure sign of which is the plethora of books 
appearing on this topic – those chosen above are but a tiny sample of the genre. 
  
Such conferences have a common format. A few humanlike robotic heads, often 
with female nomenclature, are displayed and we are encouraged to interact with 
them for the wow factor. Then a panel of geeks tells us, the lay audience, about 
their amazing advances, and how close they are to passing the Turing test 
(making interaction with social robots indistinguishable from human 
interaction). This is followed by some economists estimating the dire 
consequences of advanced technology for job prospects. Finally, a few futurists 
are also included, some even from the so-called Singularity University.i I naively 
asked one of them where this university was based and was told ‘it isn’t really a 
university’! It’s a state of mind, man. 
 
So let me first sketch out the prevailing predictions about employment, then say 
something about the hyperbole on automation, robotics and AI, and finally why 
we need more books like Urry’s What is the Future? that provide some critical 
distance on this futurist discourse.  
 
2. 
Let’s begin with Ford’s The Rise of the Robots, the Financial Times 2015 business 
book of the year. The book is laudable as a trade book, a pacey read about how 
an increasingly automated economy will affect modern workers. From 
manufacturing to services, from higher education to healthcare, myriad 
developments in AI are addressed that, according to Ford, will leave no 
occupation untouched. The scope of the book is impressive, not only in providing 
an accessible overview of the latest advances in automation, but also in 




It is a thoughtful book and while history is not Ford’s longbow, he does 
acknowledge that fears of technological unemployment are not new. Even the 
Luddites get a mention. The crux of his argument, however, is clear. All the books 
reviewed here say it with one voice: ‘this time it is different’. Yes, the masses that 
were thrown out of agriculture found jobs in factories; yes, there was the 
expansion of the service sector. But this time it really is different. A new future is 
on its way, and it’s scary. Ford’s book is peppered with words and phrases like 
‘frightening’, ‘tipping point’, and a ‘perfect storm’.  
 
According to Ford, information technology (IT) is the game changer, a uniquely 
disruptive force that has no historical precedent. This is because it is not only the 
low-skilled that will be displaced, but highly skilled professionals are also at risk 
of being displaced by machines. Where previous waves of automation ultimately 
created wealth and new sectors of employment, we are now witnessing a 
fundamental shift in the relationship between workers and machines. Machines 
are no longer tools; they are turning into the workers themselves. ‘All this 
progress is, of course,’ Ford writes, ‘being driven by the relentless acceleration in 
computer technology’ (p. xii). As usual, Moore’s law is invoked to prove the 
inexorability of accelerating technical progress. 
 
The popular commentators and journalists, not to mention the business 
consultants, seem to devour this bleak picture with a Frankensteinian relish. It is 
what Urry calls in his book the ‘new catastrophism’: we stand in awe - and 
terrified expectation - of what we have created, awaiting the devastating 
consequences.  
 
So what is the empirical evidence for Ford’s thesis? Interestingly, Ford pauses 
halfway through Chapter 2 to eschew a too simple narrative that puts advancing 
technology ‘front and center’ as the explanation for the troubling economic 
trends he identifies, but then quickly reasserts that IT’s relentless acceleration 
sets it apart. Tellingly, he says, ‘I’m content to leave it to economic historians to 
delve into the data’. Evidence is largely presented in the form of vivid stories 
about the feats of Big Data and ‘deep’ machine learning. Here pride of place is 
given to artificial neural networks – systems that are designed using the same 
fundamental operating principles as the human brain – that can be used to 
recognize images or spoken words, translate languages, etc. Such systems 
already power Apple’s Siri and, potentially, could transform the nature and 
number of knowledge-based jobs. If IBM’s Watson can win Jeopardy! and 
Google’s AI can recognize cats’ faces based on millions of YouTube videos, then, 
Ford surmises, few jobs will remain.  
 
Like almost everyone else, he cites the Oxford Martin School’s Frey and Osborne, 
whose line about half of US jobs being vulnerable to machine automation within 
the next two decades is endlessly repeated.ii This estimate, by the way, is based 
on an algorithm that predicts the susceptibility to automation of different 
occupations (rather than on the task content of individual jobs). That this 
methodology has been heavily critiqued has done nothing to halt its endless 
citation.iii They are both nice guys so good luck to them, but the uncritical 
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proliferation of their findings is further proof of the pleasure - even pride - we 
take in the idea that a man-made, robot-worked utopia/dystopia is on its way.  
 
The hyperbole about AI has reached such proportions that even New Scientist 
(16 July 2016) recently asked ‘Will AI’s bubble pop?’. The author makes the 
point, familiar to sociologists of science, about the powerful role of metaphors in 
persuading us that these machines are acquiring human capacities. Yet artificial 
neural networks do not ‘learn’ like we do, ‘cognitive’ computing does not think, 
and ‘neural’ networks are not neurons. The language is purposefully saturated 
with anthropomorphism. Rather than worry about the dreaded moment of 
Singularity, we should be concerned about the dominance of a small number of 
corporations who have this computing power and about the social consequences 
thereof. Such political questions are too often lost in our obsession with the 
robotic revolution we are set to witness. 
 
In the crystal ball of Susskind and Susskind, this imminent revolution is seen to 
be even more dramatic than the forecast of Ford. While Ford believes that higher 
education and health care professionals are relatively immune from automation, 
the authors of The Future of the Professions specifically include them in their 
sweeping diagnosis about the end of the professions as we know them. In the 
Internet society, they argue, we will neither need nor want doctors, teachers, 
accountants, architects, the clergy, consultants or lawyers to work in the way 
they did in the twentieth century. Although this will lead to massive job loss, this 
trend is a positive development as the Internet will ultimately democratize 
expertise and empower people.  
 
With a nod to Abbott, they begin by outlining the historic basis of 
professionalism as the main way expertise has been institutionalized in 
industrial societies. Until now there has been no alternative, as only human 
professionals have had the complex combination of formal knowledge, know-
how, expertise, experience and skills they refer to as ‘practical expertise’. But 
now, echoing the books above, we are on the brink of a period of fundamental 
and irreversible change, driven by technology. The authors envisage increasingly 
capable machines– from telepresence to AI – that will bring fundamental change 
in the way that ‘practical expertise’ of specialists is made available in society. 
These smart machines, operating autonomously or with non-specialist users, will 
perform many of the tasks that have been the preserve of the professions. The 
result will be the ‘routinization and commoditization of professional work’, an 
argument much like Braverman’s proletarianization thesis but without the 
political economy. Here the only actors are the machines themselves. 
 
Richard Susskind has been a leading analyst of the impact of technology on the 
legal profession for several decades and he is a firm believer in the positive 
opportunities for information sharing afforded by the Internet. And the book’s 
core moral argument is persuasive. Who would disagree that expensive and 
exclusive privileged elites need to be overhauled and instead we should promote 
the widespread distribution of expert knowledge? Indeed, the authors envision a 
model where most professional advice is delivered by automated IT systems, and 
it is available free to users (just like Wikipedia). Once again we are told about the 
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unprecedented acceleration in the capabilities of IT, AI, Watson, machine 
learning, Big Data and affective computing. The nub of the matter here though is 
the premise that intelligent machines, drawing on vast amounts of data, will 
make better decisions than do mere flawed human experts. The archetypal 
example is the lack of sound sentencing by tired judges after lunch. Perhaps non-
alcoholic lunches would be a simpler solution! 
 
3. 
The fundamental problem we have is that technologies are only as good as their 
makers. There is mounting evidence that machine-learning algorithms, like all 
previous technologies, bear the imprint of their designers and culture. Whether 
it’s Airbnb discriminating against guests with distinctively African-American 
names, Google showing advertisements for highly paid jobs primarily to men 
rather than women, or the use of data-driven risk-assessment tools in ‘predictive 
policing’, histories of discrimination live on in digital platforms and become part 
of the logic of everyday algorithmic systems.iv Even the much-lauded Wikipedia 
is skewed, in its representation of male to female scientists for instance. While 
the Susskinds are right to contest the power of the professions, they seem 
unconcerned with the rise of an even more powerful elite of male white Silicon 
Valley engineers whose values and biases will inevitable shape the technical 
systems they design. Making the politics of algorithms visible, explicit, and 
accountable may turn out to be even more difficult than calling, say, lawyers to 
account. 
 
I’m with Brynjolfsson and McAfee who, in The Second Machine Age, argue that 
the most efficient future lies with machines and humans working together. 
Human beings will always have value to add as collaborators with machines. For 
a start, I do not believe that all the knowledge and experience, the ‘practical 
expertise’ of professionals, can be conveyed via online intelligent systems. Take 
the suggestion that even the problem of ‘empathy’ in delivering bad news in 
hospitals could be countered through an algorithm using consumers’ 
‘psychological and emotional profiles’. Leaving aside the privacy issues this 
raises, the Susskinds do not grasp the nature of the ‘unrecognized’ emotional 
work that is already delegated to largely female para-professionals such as 
nurses.  
 
Indeed, the social character of skill and expertise, let alone the way that the 
professions have traditionally been structured around a gendered division of 
labour, gets no mention in this book (or in any of the others for that matter). We 
may be ‘suckers for the wide eyes and endearing giggles of affective robots’, but 
to advocate the use of robots for empathetic care of the elderly mistakes the 
appearance of care with real empathy and genuine personal interaction. And 
anyway, as any roboticist will tell you, there is a huge chasm between the current 
claims about what these affective, sociable robots can technically feasibly do and 
what they really can do. Perhaps if eldercare was revalued and remunerated like 
say coding work, the putative labour shortages in this sector that robots are 
designed to alleviate would disappear. Or, more radically, if housing and cities 
were redesigned so that the elderly were not relegated to separate places but 
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were integrated into the wider civil society. But such thoughts are way beyond 
the scope of any of these books.  
 
The Second Machine Age is the best of this bunch. While covering similar ground, 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee provide a much more balanced account of the pros and 
cons of automation on work. The book has been extremely influential, spawning 
a number of imitations (viz the Chair of DAVOS Klaus Schwab’s The Fourth 
Industrial Revolution). The titles of these books are themselves worthy of an 
article. Here, the history of technology starts with the industrial revolution (‘the 
first machines age’) and our interest in AI dates from the 1950s.  If you want to 
remind yourself of how much older our obsession with the vitality of machines 
actually is, I suggest a quick visit to the current exhibition on Robots at London’s 
Science Museum. 
 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee are ultimately optimistic about the jobs that will be 
created as a result of the digital revolution. Although agreeing that many jobs 
will be swept away by innovations like the driverless car and 3D printers, they 
argue that, with the right policy levers, such advances can bring forth a bountiful 
future of less toil, more creative work and greater human freedom. Intervention 
is crucial given the worrying trends they identify: the polarization of the labour 
market, the rise in income inequality, and the ‘winner-take-all economy’. But, if 
we ‘race with machines, instead of against them’, we can take advantage of the 
uniquely human qualities of creativity, ideation, and communication to create 
more high quality jobs such as creative writers, digital scientists and 
entrepreneurs. While they too reify technology, treating it as a neutral inevitable 
force driving these changes, they are strong advocates of government investment 
in education and infrastructure to deal with its effects. For them, unlike Urry, the 
effects of technology are political but the causes are not. 
 
Interestingly, like Ford, they propose a guaranteed basic income as one practical 
solution to the problem of technological unemployment. That this idea has once 
again become popular across the entire political spectrum makes me a little 
wary. It immediately conjures up a vision in which the Silicon Valley tech crowd 
continue to thrive on 24/7 working hours, while those left behind are paid to 
watch TV and sleep (judging by what the unemployed do now). This idea has a 
long and sound history and I am watching with interest the trials taking place in 
Finland and the Netherlands, for example. But in the current context, it is as well 
to focus on the huge unmet needs we have and the plentiful work that needs 
doing. Notwithstanding all these books, there is little convincing evidence that 
large-scale technological unemployment is actually happening or will happen in 
the immediate future. The real issue is the unequal distribution of work, time 
and money that exist already.  
 
All these authors shy away from addressing the extent to which the pursuit of 
profit, rather than progress, shapes the development of digital technologies on 
an ongoing basis, and the ways in which these very same technologies are 
facilitating not less work but more worse jobs. It is the proverbial elephant in the 
room. They seem blind to the huge, casual, insecure, low paid workforce that 
powers the wheels of the likes of Google, Amazon, and Twitter. Information 
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systems rely on armies of coders, data cleaners, page raters, porn filterers, and 
checkers, subcontractors who are recruited through global sites such as 
Mechanical Turk and who do not appear on the company payroll. Even 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee overlook such classed, gendered, racialized data 
processing work as if algorithms trained, tuned and augmented themselves like 
magic.v While these kinds of jobs may well in turn be automated, other novel 
forms will be created in unexpected ways as capital seeks new ways to 
accumulate. As Suchman argues, the enchantment or magic of artifacts (such as 
AI and robotics) is brought about through the masking of labours of production 
in precisely this way.vi  
 
4.  
As someone immersed in these debates, I have been wondering for some time 
why this perennial anxiety about automation has come to the fore now. What is 
the cultural significance of all this breathless talk about AI? No amount of 
economic history shakes the certainty: This time it really - really - is different.vii  
 
In this context, Urry’s astute reflections in What is the Future?, published 
posthumously, could not be more apposite. The social sciences must reclaim the 
terrain of future studies, he argues, because future visions have enormously 
powerful consequences for society, carrying with them implicit ideas about 
public purposes and the common good. Thus, a ‘key question for social science is 
who or what owns the future – this capacity to own futures being central in how 
power works’ (p. 11).  
 
The book begins with a comprehensive overview of the history of ‘past futures’, 
from More’s Utopia (which depicted a six hour working day half a millennium 
before Keynes) to the remarkable explosion of new dystopian futures that 
emerged in the early years of this century. This new catastrophism in social 
thought is contrasted with the global optimism of the 1990s, especially the 
digital utopianism that accompanied the emergence of the World Wide Web. 
Haraway’s upbeat ‘manifesto for cyborgs’, for example, celebrated the positive 
potential of technoscience to create new meanings and new entities, to make 
new worlds. 
 
 So it is all the more striking that the Zeitgeist within the rich North so radically 
changed from 2003 onwards. Urry makes this point starkly by simply listing, on 
pages 36 and 37, the astonishing number of English language texts, films, art 
exhibitions, and research centres within this catastrophic mode. As he rightly 
argues, such dystopian writing induces a fatalism about the future, helps 
mobilize powerful interests to promote planetary technological fixes (especially 
for climate change), and is as much performative as analytic or representational. 
As I have already intimated, I share this same unease about the rash of books on 
technological unemployment.  
 
While much of this is familiar territory, viz. the sociology of expectations and 
Jasanoff’s writing on sociotechnical imaginariesviii, Urry goes further in 
specifying how futures thinking as a ‘method’ is a way of bringing back planning, 
but under a new name. Planning, he says, has become an ideologically 
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contaminated term from the era of organized capitalism and social democracy. 
So this is a new form of planning, one that brings the state and civil society back 
in from the cold, and planning is crucial given the long-term wickedness of many 
problems such as climate change. Only by insisting that futures are always social 
can public bodies, rather than autonomous markets and endogenous 
technologies, become central to disentangling, debating and delivering those 
futures.  
 
Urry was a leading figure in British sociology and, given the sheer range and 
magnitude of his outputs, it is hard to exaggerate his influence. He was wholly 
committed to the discipline, always energetically pursuing new ideas, and often 
prescient in identifying key under-explored social issues of the day. What many 
will be less aware of are his direct contributions to policy, both to the climate 
change area and transport. He was appointed to the UK Government’s Foresight 
programme on transport and policy futures, which in turn led to his research on 
social futures, as well as his setting up an Institute for Social Futures at Lancaster 
University.  
 
The book therefore builds on long-standing research projects, with substantial 
chapters on mobilities in the city, 3D printing and the future of manufacturing, 
and the futures of energy and climate change. Throughout, he manages to explain 
how social practices are constitutive of technology in clear, accessible prose, 
stressing how technological systems are always sociomaterial, that the process 
of innovation is complex and unpredictable, the importance of concepts such a 
path dependency and lock-in, and the need for what is often termed ‘responsible 
innovation’. For him, these features are best captured by complexity theory that 
emphasizes how systems are dynamic, processual and unpredictable. 
 
While I found the claim for the distinctiveness of this notion not altogether 
convincing, perhaps because the recent scholarship on infrastructures in science 
and technology studies is wholly compatible with his approachix, this is a minor 
quibble. I wholeheartedly agree with the spirit of his argument. The point of 
these scenario-building exercises is precisely to authorize the participation of a 
broad range of relevant actors typically excluded from processes of deliberation 
about the future. And this is turn would entail democratizing the whole 
organization of the making of technology and, with it, society. 
 
The cover of What is the Future? features Antony Gormley’s ‘Another Place’. This 
work, located on the foreshore in Crosby Beach, Merseyside, consists of one 
hundred cast iron sculptures of the artist’s own body facing out to sea. It is a 
fitting metaphor for a book that asks us to take seriously our role as sociologists 
in crafting the future. Evoking Walter Benjamin’s Angel of History, we need to 
conjure up our own Angels of the Future, which stand on the shore of society, 
their gaze fixed on the horizon, alert to the winds of change. They must be both 
several and diverse. The homogeneity of the Silicone Valley creators is a more 
dangerous threat to the future than any perceived robotic apocalypse. Too often 
these purveyors of the future have their backs to society, enchanted by 
technological promise and blind to the problems around them. It will require 
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